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AS CSR IN INNOVATION STRATEGIES 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The present paper examines how an innovating firm decides between two forms of voluntary 
agreements (VA) in a context, where a non-governmental organization (NGO) rather than a 
regulator watches over citizens’ interests. The innovation generates profit and consumer 
surplus as well as environmental damage. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) within the 
innovation process is considered in terms of a redistribution of profit towards community 
development, with or without additional abatement efforts via a VA. Bargaining between 
firm and NGO yields the amount allocated to community development. The model 
demonstrates that the firm’s choice of VA hinges on the tradeoffs between appropriating the 
full innovation profit and paying a higher lump sum towards community development or 
sacrificing some of the innovation profit by lowering innovation effort, but gaining in terms 
of paying a lesser amount towards community development. CSR with abatement is unlikely 
in the case of radical innovations. There is also a clear divergence of interests between the 
firm, the NGO and the State for some parameter configurations, which are duly identified.  
 
Key words: Corporate social responsibility, voluntary agreements, community development 
donations, innovation 
 
 
JEL code: M14, O32, O33
1 
 
VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS CSR IN 
INNOVATION STRATEGIES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
           ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR) has become a buzzword in business circles as 
firms worldwide vie to demonstrate their engagement to society and sustainable development.  
Large corporations announce in their websites the variety of ways in which they are 
undertaking socially responsible investments, ranging from measures for good internal 
governance to supporting local development and preserving the environment. Such activities 
confirm to the definition of CSR proposed by McWilliams and Siegel (2001) as “actions that 
appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required 
by law”. The theoretical economics literature on CSR has studied the rationale for many of 
these measures, with most of the attention being centred on incentive provision by credible 
regulators for abatement by manufacturing firms. However, such a focus has overlooked two 
interesting contexts: first, the case of innovating firms, which have the possibility to choose 
between technologies ex-ante, i.e. consider abatement ex-ante to production; and second, 
developing country situations, where monitoring is not very effective and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) rather than regulators act as watchdogs of public interests. The present 
paper thus attempts to provide some insight on these less examined situations through a study 
of innovating firms in developing countries facing an NGO in lieu of a regulator, while trying 
to compensate for the damage caused to the environment by the innovation process not only 
by means of abatement but also by direct investment in community development.   
The process of ‘innovation’ is often a mixed blessing, bringing societal benefits and 
causing social damages at the same time. Examples abound, especially in developing 
countries, where monitoring is weak and regulation is less stringent. For instance, the 
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diffusion of genetically modified seeds – a radical innovation, by agbiotech firms like 
Monsanto, Bayer and Aventis have led to contamination in some regions and threatened local 
biodiversity (Clapp, 2008; Ramani, 2008). Clinical trials are an essential part of new drug 
discovery and this risky phase of drug innovation is increasingly outsourced to developing 
countries. Many top pharmaceutical firms like Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi-Aventis and 
Bayer have been hauled for malpractice related to outsourcing clinical trial contracts to 
unscrupulous hospitals, physicians and medical faculty with insufficient monitoring 
(Kelleher, 2004). Innovation creation can generate damage even in State supported projects. 
For instance, though STMicroelectronics has generated hundreds of jobs in the Grenoble 
region of France, there have been steady protests against STM on account of the capture of 
local resources, environmental degradation and potential risks of conducting experiments and 
producing products based on nanotechnology (Vinck, 2010). 
The diffusion of innovations by firms can be helped or hindered by other stakeholders 
like NGOs. Indeed, the course of diffusion of some radical innovations like ‘terminator 
seeds’ or ‘antiretrovirals’ have been heavily marked by confrontation with NGOs (Ramani 
and Mukherjee, 2008). For instance, worldwide protests by activists rather than any public 
intervention led to the withdrawal of genetically modified sterile seeds called ‘terminator 
seeds’ commercialized by Monsanto in 1998, which risked changing the age old tradition of 
farmers to save seeds from one harvest for the next. Similarly, in 2001, when Cipla developed 
a HIV-AIDS drugs cocktail and offered it to NGOs at $350 per annum per patient for 
developing country patients, a set of pharma majors selling similar drugs all over the world 
for $10,000 per annum per patient, filed a case against Cipla at the World Trade 
Organization. However, concerted pressure from NGOs and civic bodies all over the world 
led to a vote in Cipla’s favour.  
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The study of the strategic rationale of CSR undertakings by firms is relatively recent. 
It was triggered to explain the reality of CSR against the strong theoretical arguments of 
conventional economics, as exemplified by Friedman (1970), asserting that a firm’s 
responsibility to society must be limited to compliance with existing regulations as anything 
over and above would be an encroachment on the rights of the State and act against the 
interests of shareholders. A seminal theoretical model by Baron (2001) resolved this paradox 
by distinguishing between different motives for CSR. Firms may redistribute their profits 
because of ‘altruistic’ preferences or as a ‘strategic response’ to demands being made by 
other stakeholders in the market such as consumers, NGOs or regulators. While the former 
type of CSR is profit sacrificing in its spirit and extremely rare, the latter comprises a variety 
of new incarnations of traditional strategies for profit maximization through reputation gains 
and building up of brand loyalty. 
Most of the theoretical literature on CSR concerns itself with strategic CSR rather 
than altruistic CSR. In a recent survey of this stream of work, Lyon and Maxwell (2008) 
point out that the motivation for firms to practice strategic environmental CSR stems from the 
demand, supply and financial sides of the market. For instance, if consumers are willing to 
pay a premium for ‘green products’ then firms will invest in environmental friendly 
technology (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995). CSR could also emerge because of market 
competition between environmental friendly ‘green products’ and damaging ‘brown 
products’. If the market for ‘browns’ is competitive, their price will be lower, the demand 
will be higher and consequently there will less incentive for firms to undertake CSR (Bagnoli 
and Watts, 2003). From the financial side, if investors are interested in supporting ‘green’ 
companies then CSR would also increase (Baron 2007). 
           Besides investment in green technologies, Lyon and Maxwell (2008) point out that 
voluntary agreements (VA) on abatement can also be considered as a form of strategic CSR.  
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Though VAs constitute an environmental friendly action not required by law to voluntarily 
internalize the negative externalities generated, they are usually undertaken in response to 
external threats either from regulators or activist groups. The scope for VAs emerges because 
both the firm and the regulator foresee that if the voluntary agreement fails, both of them will 
incur costs. Firms accept VAs because they serve to avoid or mitigate harsher regulation and 
costs of lobbying, while regulators prefer VAs as they eliminate the costs of formulating and 
passing regulation and thereafter monitoring and enforcing compliance. All these costs are 
avoided when the VA comes through.  
Interestingly, the theoretical models dealing with VA make no reference to ‘CSR’ per 
se, being entirely focused on ‘abatement of environmental damage’ through regulation and 
complementary mechanisms. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that firms consider CSR 
investments in a more holistic manner determining allocation of investment to not only 
‘doing less bad’ but also to ‘doing more good’ (Aguilera et al. 2007). Firms can do more 
good in a variety of ways ranging from supporting worthy causes including investing in 
community development to innovation. Indeed Porter and Kramer (2002) demonstrate that 
even corporate philanthropy can be used as an instrument of strategy to build competitive 
advantage. 
              In the above perspective, the present paper focuses on VA with strategic corporate 
philanthropy. It considers a developing country context in which a self-less NGO guards 
citizens’ interests in the absence of monitoring by the regulator. It then examines the strategic 
options of a firm contemplating innovation to ‘do more good’ knowing well that the 
innovation by itself can also generate some environmental and social damage, i.e. ‘do some 
bad’. If the NGO becomes aware of the damage associated with the innovation process, it 
moves to press for complete compensation of damages and the imposition of an additional 
fine. But the NGO may or may not be successful in its efforts. To avoid the threat of paying 
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fines and associated transaction costs, the firm can initiate a VA that offers to redistribute 
profits towards community development. But the firm also has the option of choosing and 
announcing its abatement effort before the VA. Once the firm decides on the type of VA to 
offer, it bargains with the NGO on the lump sum payment for community development. The 
paper then analyzes the determinants of the firm’s choice between the two innovation cum 
CSR strategies: ‘voluntary agreement without abatement’ and ‘voluntary agreement with 
abatement’ with VA specific lump sum transfers for community development. It also ranks 
the ensuring outcomes from the perspective of the NGO and the State.  
The original features of the theoretical model developed in this paper are as follows. 
The firm considered is in innovation mode and therefore it faces a technological and market 
uncertainty that is absent in the environment of a standard manufacturing enterprise with an 
established market. The innovating firm must decide on its innovation effort, knowing full 
well that it may not succeed. Furthermore, the innovating firm has not just one but two CSR 
choices via VA. Either it can just ‘do more good’ by disclosing information on potential 
damage and investing in local community development. Or the firm can ‘do more good’ and 
‘less bad’ by again disclosing the information on the potential damage, and investing in 
abatement effort in addition to redistributing funds for local community development. Third, 
in the absence of effective monitoring by the regulator, a watchful NGO monitors the 
innovating firm. But, unlike a regulator whose objective is to maximize social welfare, an 
NGO only bargains with the innovating firm to maximize the societal value from the 
innovation minus expected firm profit.  
The contribution of our work to the existing literature on strategic CSR can now be 
highlighted in four points.   
First, the theoretical literature on strategic CSR considers only one form of CSR at a 
time, either private provision of public goods or corporate philanthropy, but not both. 
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Moreover, the study of environmental VA is vis-à-vis an existing system of production and 
initiated in response to the demands of a regulator or to the threat of regulation. In contrast, 
the present paper develops a game theoretic model of an innovating firm choosing between 
more than one innovation cum CSR choices, ex-ante to production, in response to being 
potentially targeted by an NGO, in the absence of a credible system of public regulation.  
Second, while the literature on VA explains the reasons for the often observed soft 
regulatory stance against polluting firms, it is silent on why some polluting firms prefer to 
practice CSR in the form of donations to community development instead of investing in 
abatement, and furthermore, why this is tolerated by regulators. Our model provides a partial 
explanation for this at least in the context of innovation. When a firm invests in abatement, it 
lowers its innovation effort, and hence its expected innovation profit, but in the process it also 
lowers its non-abatement related CSR. Such trade-offs play a crucial role in the determination 
of the firm’s choice of innovation cum CSR strategy, which has been mostly ignored in the 
existing VA and CSR literature. We argue that such ‘trade offs’ are also important for 
society1 because the foregone innovation value (i.e. sum of firm profit and consumer surplus 
out of the successful innovation) due to reduced innovation effort is a cost to society as well. 
The welfare analysis shows that there are zones of conflict, where the societal preference 
over the different CSR strategies does not match the firm’s preference.  
 Third, the model indicates that NGOs, though not taking into account the interests of 
the firm, can play a role similar to that of a regulator in monitoring the firm, whenever the 
latter is missing or inefficient. In seminal papers such as by Segerson and Miceli (1998) and 
Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000), greater the credible threat from regulators, higher the 
abatement level agreed upon in VA by firms. Glachant (2007) shows that if the consumer 
groups are allowed in the bargaining process, the abatement level itself will increase, as 
                                                            
1 Note that ‘State’ and ‘society’ are used interchangeably and their objective is to maximize social welfare. 
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stronger NGOs are likely to have greater public support. We refine the above results by 
demonstrating that in the case of innovation, if the probability of detection of damage by the 
NGO is very high, then the firm will not engage in innovation in the first place. However, if 
the probability of detection is within an appropriate range then the higher the threat from the 
NGO, the greater the abatement effort. Finally, it provides an alternative NGO mode of 
correction by VA to the scheme suggested by Blackman, Lyon and Sisto (2008) for 
developing countries, involving fines to be imposed on local regulatory authorities by the 
federal ones, which are rather difficult to implement in regions with weak enforcement 
capabilities. 
 Fourth, our model adds additional insight to the comprehensive work by Baron 
(2001), Baron and Diermeier (2007) and Baron (2009) on the role of NGOs in influencing 
firm actions. These papers examine direct confrontations between firms and NGOs, 
considering the bargaining power of each in different ways – such as the degree of 
responsiveness of firms and the financial clout of the NGOs. A common result is that the 
higher the bargaining power of the NGOs, the greater the CSR response from the firms. 
Though the nature of interaction between the firm and NGO is completely different in our 
model, we confirm some of their results with respect to innovation. For instance, the transfer 
from the firm (i.e. CSR expenditure) is higher for lower fixed costs of the activist and for 
higher stakes of the firm (i.e. innovation value in our case). In addition, the value-added of 
our work is with respect to an evaluation of total welfare, which is not examined in their 
models. Our inclusion of social welfare reveals that under some parameter configurations the 
VA outcome will not be the preferred outcome of either the NGO or society and sometimes 
even the preferences of the NGO can be non-welfare maximizing. The results indicate that a 
regulator’s task is very complex when dealing with contested innovations and advocates 
handling them on a case by case basis.  
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 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. 
Section 3 discusses the results. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
              Consider a firm applying an innovation effort 0ie ≥ , which can lead to successful 
commercialization with a probability of ( )ip e . In case of market success, the innovation 
generates a profit 0π >  for the firm, a surplus c > 0 for the consumers. A negative externality 
amounting to a social damage of D > 0 is also generated in the process, irrespective of the 
success of the project. However, the damage can be reduced, if the firm exerts an abatement 
effort 0je > . The cost function of the firm is given by ( , )i jg e e . 
In the absence of monitoring by the regulator, an NGO protects the interests of 
citizens. Let the exogenous probability that the NGO will discover the social damage D be 
given by 0β > 2. In case of discovery, the NGO starts a legal process for implementing the 
existing regulation, or in absence of one, starts lobbying for the creation of a new regulation, 
which will force the firm to compensate ( )D F+  to the consumers, with F > 0 being the 
punishment levied for suppressing the damage. However, enforcement of punishment is not 
certain. Depending on the responsiveness of the existing legal framework, the NGO is 
successful with a probability 0γ > . Moreover, as the NGO puts this process into motion, both 
parties incur costs. Let the fixed costs of the NGO, to furnish the prosecution with hard proof 
of damage D be A > 0. Similarly, let the fixed costs of the firm to lobby and redeem its 
reputation be T > 0.  
           The firm and the NGO, however, can avoid the costs related to the discovery of the 
damage and subsequent prosecution by initiating a voluntary agreement (VA).  In the VA the 
                                                            
2 In absence of the NGO, β = 0.  
9 
 
firm pre-empts the prosecution or new legislation by making an a priori payment of z 
towards community development projects. Two paths for VA initiation are considered 
namely with or without an initial ‘abatement effort’ on the part of the firm. In the first, the 
firm does not spend any abatement effort ej before entering the VA, going directly to 
negotiate the community development expenditure z = zw > 0 with the NGO. In contrast, in 
the second type, ‘VA with abatement’, the firm undertakes an a priori abatement effort 
0je >  before initiating the VA and then bargains about the investment on community 
development, 0az z= > .  
 The values of ,i je e and z are decided sequentially as follows. At the start, say at time 
1t = , the firm decides on its innovation effort, ie , or its innovation and abatement efforts, 
( , )i je e . Then, at time 2t = , nature plays out discovery of D with probability 0β > . 
Following this, at time 3t = , the firm and the NGO bargain over z incorporating the fact that 
in 4t = , the NGO will be successful in forcing compensation with probability γ . If the 
bargaining is accomplished then the VAs are implemented and payoffs are realized given that 
the innovation will be successfully commercialized with a probability ( )ip e . In case of 
disagreement, the NGO initiates the court procedure and the firm and the NGO incur fixed 
costs of T and A respectively. In addition, under disagreement, the firm accepts the outcome 
of the legal process and pays an additional fine of F with probability γ . Payoffs are realized 
at 5t = . This sequence is represented in figure 1. 
{Insert figure 1 here] 
Four standard assumptions are made to simplify the model:  
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Assumption 1: The returns to innovation effort are positive and diminishing in scale for the 
firm; i.e. ( ) 0;i
i
dp e
de
>  and 
2
2
( ) 0;i
i
d p e
de
>  for all 0ie ≥ . Similarly, the returns to abatement 
effort are also positive in terms of damage reduction; i.e. 
( )
0j
j
dD e
de
< for all 0je ≥ . 
 
Assumption 2: The marginal cost of supplying either type of effort is positive and increasing 
in either type of effort i.e: 
2 2
20, 0, 0k l kk
g g g
e e ee
∂ ∂ ∂> > >∂ ∂ ∂∂  and  (0, ) 0lk
g e
e
∂ =∂  for all l, with k = 
i, j; l k≠ . This implies that a rise in innovation (abatement) effort not only increases the 
marginal cost of supplying the innovation (abatement) effort, but also the marginal cost of 
supplying the abatement (innovation) effort. The assumption is realistic because the skill 
requirements of the two activities are different. Additional funding for one raises the marginal 
cost of funding the other. 
Assumption 3: The NGO is selfless and seeks to maximize the returns to the consumer from 
the innovation process.  
Assumption 4: There is no moral hazard on the part of the firm or NGO, and therefore, there 
are no costs to monitor either party in a VA.  
Now we turn to analyze the outcomes of the two types of VA initiation strategies 
described above.  
 
2.1 VA WITHOUT ABATEMENT 
Consider the situation when the NGO has discovered the damage associated with the 
innovation and the firm has decided to offer a VA without abatement, i.e. with 0je = . If the 
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bargaining at 3t =  about the community development investment, wz , is successful  the 
agreement payoff of the firm, wπ , is given by: 
( ) ( ,0)w i ip e z g eπ π= − − ;         (1) 
and the agreement payoff of the NGO, wϕ , is given by: 
( ) (0);w ip e c z Dϕ = + −          (2) 
where D(0) represents the damage level with 0je = . 
If the bargaining breaks down, then the disagreement payoff for the firm is 
( ( ) [ ( (0) ) ] ( ,0))i ip e D F T g eπ γ− + + − ; while for the NGO it is 
( ( ) (0) [ ( (0) ) ])ip e c D D F Aγ− + + − . A bargaining solution for the CSR investment z exists if 
the bargaining surplus of both the firm and the NGO is positive i.e. if the following inequality 
holds: 
[ ( (0) ) ] [ ( (0) ) ].D F A z D F Tγ γ+ − < < + +        (3) 
The Nash bargaining solution implies that the CSR investment without abatement, wz , 
should be:  
( )( (0) )
2w
T Az D Fγ −= + +          (4) 
which clearly satisfies the condition (3). Therefore, both parties prefer the VA outcome as 
compared to the disagreement one.  
Now let us return to the start of the game, at 1t = , to understand the firm’s choice of 
innovation effort ie . Recall that the VA is offered only in the context of the NGO having 
discovered the damage. This means that in the probability (1 – β) of non-discovery, the firm 
enjoys profit [p(ei)π – g(ei, 0)] and the NGO receives [p(ei)c – D(0)]. Incorporating this and 
substituting the value of wz  in equation (1) we obtain the reduced form expected profit 
function of the firm as: 
12 
 
( )ˆ ( ) ( (0) ) ( ,0).
2w i i
T Ap e D F g eβπ π βγ −= − + − −       (5) 
At 1t = , the firm maximizes ˆwπ  by choosing an appropriate value of 0ie ≥ . Given 
assumptions 1 and 2, the interior solution of the maximization problem, the innovation effort 
without abatement, wie , exists satisfying the following conditions: 
( ) ( ,0)
w
wi
i
i i
dp e g e
de e
π ∂= ∂           (6) 
( ) ( ,0)
( (0) )
2
w w
i ip e g e
T AD F
πβ
γ
−≤ −+ +
         (7) 
Since in the case of detection the firm has to pay an extra amount wz  for entering in 
VA, the higher value of β reduces firm’s expected profit. Therefore, whenever the probability 
of detection of damage associated with an innovation, β, is very high such that inequality (7) 
is violated, the firm does not invest in innovation in the first place, i.e. 0ie = ; and the case 
for spending in community development does not arise 
Substituting wie  in equation (1) and equation (2), we obtain the equilibrium payoffs of 
the firm and the NGO respectively as: 
* ( )( ) ( (0) ) ( ,0)
2
w w
w i i
T Ap e D F g eπ π γ −= − + − −       (8) 
and,  
* ( )( ) ( (0) ) (0)
2
w
w i
T Ap e c D F Dϕ γ −= + + + − .      (9) 
Since the equilibrium CSR contribution without abatement *wz , is independent of 
innovation effort wie , it is given by the expression on the right hand side of equation (4). 
Assuming a utilitarian welfare function, the equilibrium societal welfare level *wS , is given 
by: 
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* ( )( ) ( ,0) (0).w ww i iS p e c g e Dπ= + − −       (10) 
Note that the CSR investment *wz  does not influence social welfare, as it is a pure 
transfer from the firm to the NGO. Since both the parties are better off with the VA outcome, 
it is clear that society enjoys a higher welfare with a VA than without one.  
 
2.2 VA WITH ABATEMENT 
As in the preceding case, let us start by supposing that the NGO has discovered the 
damage associated with the innovation and the firm has decided to offer a VA with 
abatement, i.e. with 0je > . Assumption 1 implies that ( ) (0)jD e D<   for all values of 
0je > . At 3t = , if the bargaining over community development investment, az , is 
successful, the agreement payoff of the firm aπ , is given by: 
( ) ( , );a i i jp e z g e eπ π= − −         (11) 
while that of the NGO is: 
( ) ( ).a i jp e c z D eϕ = + −         (12) 
If the bargaining breaks down, then the firm gets 
( ( ) [ ( ( ) ) ] ( , ));i j i jp e D e F T g e eπ γ− + + −  while the NGO gets 
( ( ) ( ) [ ( ( ) ) ]i j jp e c D e D e F Aγ− + + − . There exists a CSR abatement investment z acceptable 
to both parties if the bargaining surplus is positive for both of them, i.e. if the following 
inequality holds: 
[ ( ( ) ) ] [ ( ( ) ) ]j jD e F A z D e F Tγ γ+ − < < + + .     (13) 
Then the Nash bargaining solution az  satisfying condition (13) is: 
( )( ( ) )
2a j
T Az D e Fγ −= + + .       (14) 
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which clearly satisfies the condition (13). Therefore, both parties prefer the VA outcome as 
compared to the disagreement one.  
Now let us again return to the start of the game. Recall that the VA is offered only if 
the damage is detected, i.e. with probability β. Otherwise, i.e. with probability (1 – β) the firm 
enjoys a profit of [p(ei)π – g(ei, ej)] and the NGO receives [p(ei)c – D(ej)]. Integrating this fact 
and substituting the value of wz  in equation (11) we obtain the reduced form expected profit 
function of the firm as: 
( )ˆ ( ) ( ( ) ) ( , )
2a i j i j
T Ap e D e F g e eβπ π βγ −= − + − − .    (15) 
At 1t = , therefore, the firm maximizes ˆaπ  by choosing an appropriate value of 
{ 0, 0}i je e≥ ≥  and given assumptions 1 and 2, the interior solution to the maximization 
problem { , }a ai je e exists satisfying the following equations: 
( ) ( , )
a
a ai
i j
i i
dp e g e e
de e
π ∂= ∂ ;        (16) 
( )
( , )
a
j a a
i j
j j
dD e g e e
de e
βγ ∂− = ∂ ;        (17) 
( )
( ) ( , )
( )
2
a w a
i i j
a
j
p e g e e
T AD e F
πβ
γ
−≤ −+ +
.        (18) 
            In the VA with abatement also, higher the damage detection by the NGO, β,  lower 
the firm’s expected profit as the firm pays az  for entering in the VA. Therefore if β is high 
enough and inequality (7) is violated, the firm will not even undertake innovation and there 
will be no negotiation over the community development expenditure.  
Substituting aie  and 
a
je  in equation (11) and equation (12) we can obtain the 
equilibrium payoffs of the firm and the NGO as: 
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* ( )( ) ( ( ) ) ( , );
2
a a a a
a i j i j
T Ap e D e F g e eπ π γ −= − + − −      (19) 
and,     
* ( )( ) ( ( ) ) ( )
2
a a a
a i j j
T Ap e c D e F D eϕ γ −= + + + − .     (20) 
Furthermore, from (14) the equilibrium CSR contribution with abatement *az , can be 
calculated as: 
* ( )( ( ) )
2
a
a j
T Az D e Fγ −= + + .       (21) 
At equilibrium, social welfare *aS , is given by:  
* ( )( ) ( , ) ( )a a a aa i i j jS p e c g e e D eπ= + − − .      (22) 
Interestingly, *aS  is independent of the CSR investment towards community development. 
 
3. CSR CHOICES / INNOVATION STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Having characterized the CSR contributions of the firm under ‘VA without abatement’ 
and ‘VA with abatement’, in the previous section, we now identify the circumstances under 
which the firm will choose one or the other of the VA in its innovation process. Then, we 
examine the best outcomes of the innovation process from the perspective of the NGO and 
society. Finally, we locate the zones where the choices of the firm and the outcomes desired 
by other stakeholders do not match.  
Before proceeding further, in order to ensure that the firm can consider either of the two 
innovation strategies we need to make the following last assumption.  
Assumption 5: ( )
( ) ( , )( ) ( ,0)min ,
( (0) ) ( )
2 2
a w aw w i i ji i
a
j
p e g e ep e g e
T A T AD F D e F
ππβ
γ γ
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥−< ⎢ ⎥− −+ + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,  
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Assumption 5 ensures that both of the equations (7) and (18) are satisfied at the same time 
and innovation is indeed untaken. This also leads us to the first proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: The firm adopts the ‘VA without abatement’ as its innovation cum CSR 
strategy under one of two conditions: 
-  If γM + N  ≤ 0 ; or 
- If 0M Nπ γ≥ + >  where (0) ( )
( ) ( )
a
j
w a
i i
D D e
M
p e p e
−= −  and 
( ,0) ( , )
( ) ( )
w a a
i i j
w a
i i
g e g e e
N
p e p e
−= − . 
Proof. Due to the profit maximization objective of the firm, it chooses the ‘VA without 
abatement’ strategy over the ‘VA with abatement’ strategy if and only if * *w aπ π≥ . Now, 
from equations (8) and (19) we obtain: 
* * [ ( ) ( )] [ (0) ( )] [ ( ,0) ( , )].w a a w a aw a i i j i i jp e p e D D e g e g e eπ π π γ− = − − − − −   (23) 
Clearly * *w aπ π≥  if and only if:  
(0) ( ) ( ,0) ( , )
( ) ( )
a w a a
j i i j
w a
i i
D D e g e g e e
M N
p e p e
γπ γ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦≥ = +− .    (24) 
 We now show that while M is always positive, the value of N may be negative or 
positive. 
Since by assumption 1, ( )i
i
dp e
de
 > 0 for all 0ie ≥ , it follows that [ ( ) ( )] 0w ai ip e p e− >  
if  a wi ie e< . But this is always true. Given assumptions 1 and 2, by comparing equation (6) 
with equation (16) we can see that as the firm starts supplying abatement effort, its innovation 
effort falls i.e. a wi ie e< . 
  Similarly since 
( )j
j
dD e
de
 < 0 for all values of 0je ≥ , (0) ( ) 0ajD D e⎡ ⎤− >⎣ ⎦ . Therefore,  
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(0) ( )
0
( ) ( )
a
j
w a
i i
D D e
M
p e p e
−= >− .  
What about N? As the firm moves from the ‘VA without abatement’ strategy to the 
‘VA with abatement’ strategy, ie  falls and je  rises, and we do not have a straightforward 
conclusion as to whether it will increase the over-all costs of the firm or not, while comparing 
( ,0)wig e  and ( , )
a a
i jg e e . What is clear, however, is that if costs rise, i.e. if 
( ,0) ( , )w a ai i jg e g e e< , then 
( ,0) ( , )
( ) ( )
w a a
i i j
w a
i i
g e g e e
N
p e p e
−= −  is negative. In this case, if it turns out 
that (γM + N) is negative, then since π is positive, inequality (24) is always satisfied and the 
proposition holds. However, if (γM + N) is positive, then whenever inequality (24) is valid, 
the statement of the proposition again follows.      
What is the intuition behind proposition 1? The fact that the firm’s investment in 
abatement reduces its innovation effort is the key to understanding. Whenever the firm 
undertakes abatement, there are three possible effects. First, the abatement may bring about a 
rise in the overall costs of the firm by ( , ) ( ,0)a a wi j ig e e g e⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ . Second, since abatement effort 
also lowers the innovation effort, it reduces the expected innovation profit by 
[ ( ) ( )]w ai ip e p eπ − . Third and in contrast to these negative effects, the abatement effort also 
has a positive impact on the firm’s expected profit as it decreases outlays towards community 
development by * *w az z−  as given below:  
* * (0) ( )aw a jz z D D eγ ⎡ ⎤− = −⎣ ⎦  .       (25) 
Thus, the firm’s preferred choice will depend on the magnitudes of the three effects 
on its expected profit: possible increase in over all costs, decrease in expected profit and 
decrease in CSR outlays. Here, proposition 1 predicts that if supplying abatement effort is 
very costly, the firm will not adopt the CSR strategy ‘VA with abatement’. In particular, 
whenever the innovation profit is by itself low in the first place, as in incremental 
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innovations, the firm is likely to adopt the ‘VA with abatement’ strategy as the opportunity 
cost of losing out on innovation value is less. Otherwise, the firm’s preferred choice will be 
the ‘VA without abatement’ strategy. For instance, if the innovation is radical with high 
expected profit, whatever the cost consequences of abatement, the firm will choose to supply 
CSR uniquely in the form of contributions to community development without abatement.   
 Now we turn to the implications of firm choice for the other stakeholders, namely the 
NGO and the State.  
 
PROPOSITION 2: If (1 )c Mγ< − the NGO’s payoffs are maximized, when the firm chooses 
‘VA with abatement’. However, if (1 )c Mγ> −  the NGO gains more if the firm chooses ‘VA 
without abatement’. 
Proof. From equations (9) and (20) we have that the difference between the payoffs to the 
NGO when the firm chooses ‘VA without abatement’ and ‘VA with abatement’ is:  
* * (0) ( )( ) ( ) (1 )
( ) ( )
a
jw a
w a i i w a
i i
D D e
p e p e c
p e p e
ϕ ϕ γ⎡ ⎤−⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥− = − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
    (26) 
Since ( )i
i
dp e
de
 > 0 for all 0ie ≥  by assumption 1, it follows ( ) ( ) 0w ai ip e p e⎡ ⎤− >⎣ ⎦ . Now 
applying the definition of M from proposition 1 and by using the fact 0M > , the statement of 
the proposition follows from equation (26).                
Note that when a firm chooses ‘VA with abatement’, it has a three-fold consequence 
on the NGO. On the positive side, there is a lowering of damage to the environment; but on 
the negative side, there is a lowering of consumer surplus as a part of the previous innovation 
effort is diverted to abatement and there is also a lowering of CSR outlays on community 
development. Thus, proposition 2 highlights the interesting point that the impact of the choice 
of the firm on the NGO is independent of firm profit, being a function of the returns to the 
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community. Therefore, when c is low, the loss in the innovation benefit under the ‘VA with 
abatement’ strategy is inconsequential. Since, the CSR expenditure, *az , is also less under the 
‘VA with abatement’ equilibrium, much will depend on the magnitude of the reduction to 
environmental damage (0) ( )ajD D e⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ . On the other hand, when c is high, under abatement, 
with the lowering of firm effort in innovation, the risk of loss of expected benefit from the 
innovation is higher. Therefore, the NGO prefers the firm to choose ‘VA without abatement’.  
Finally, we turn to the total welfare generated under the different scenarios, which 
should represent the preferences of the State.  
 
PROPOSITION 3: Social welfare is higher when the firm chooses ‘VA without abatement’, 
i.e. * *w aS S>   if : 
(i) M + N < 0 ; or 
(ii) π + c >  M + N given M + N  > 0.  
Proof. From equations (10) and (22) we can see that when the firm shifts from a ‘VA without 
abatement’ to a ‘VA with abatement’ strategy, social welfare changes as follows: 
( )* * [ ( ) ( )] [ (0) ( )] [ ( ,0) ( , )].w a a w a aw a i i j i i jS S c p e p e D D e g e g e eπ− = + − − − − −  
 Clearly * *w aS S>  if and only if the following inequality is satisfied: 
 
(0) ( ) ( ,0) ( , )
( ) ( )
a w a a
j i i j
w a
i i
D D e g e g e e
c M N
p e p e
π
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦+ ≥ = +− . 
And the proposition follows with the same arguments as in proposition 1 applying to the 
values of M and N.      
The intuition behind proposition 3 is similar to the previous arguments. The societal 
value of an innovation or the ‘innovation value’ is defined as (π + c) and the proposition 
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examines how this value evolves as the firm moves from ‘VA without abatement’ to ‘VA 
with abatement’ equilibrium. Again, the final outcome depends on the sum of three effects. 
As the firm adopts abatement, some of the innovation effort of the firm is channelled towards 
abatement and the expected innovation value falls and so does CSR allocated to community 
development. But, if the ‘innovation value’ is low enough, the loss in ‘innovation value’ is 
outweighed by the gain from reduced damage to the environment i.e. (0) ( )ajD D e⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ and 
society prefers the ‘VA with abatement’ adopted by the firm.  However, if π + c >  M + N 
given M + N  > 0, the expected loss associated with ‘VA with abatement’ strategy adopted 
by the firm outweighs the gain (0) ( )ajD D e⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦   and society prefers the ‘VA without 
abatement’ to the ‘VA with abatement’ strategy.  
Turning to the other side of the coin, there can also be contexts in which the firm 
prefers not to abate, but the State wants the same. The next proposition clarifies all these 
situations of conflict between the preference of the firm, the NGO and the State.  
 
PROPOSITION 4:  
(i) The innovation cum CSR strategy choice of the firm does not represent the best outcome 
for either the NGO or the State: 
• If ( )1c Mγ< −  and ( ) ( ),M N M N cπ γ∈ + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  the firm’s innovation cum CSR 
strategy consists of ‘VA without abatement’ but this is not best outcome for either the 
State  or the NGO. 
• If ( )1c Mγ> − and ( ) ( ),M N c M Nπ γ∈ + − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  the firm chooses ‘VA with 
abatement’,  but this is not the best outcome for either the State or the NGO. 
(ii) The choice of the firm is the best outcome for the State but not the NGO: 
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• If ( )1c Mγ< − and M N cπ > + − , the firm chooses ‘VA without abatement’, which 
maximizes social welfare but is not best outcome for the NGO.  
•  If ( )1c Mγ> −  and  M N cπ < + − , the firm chooses ‘VA with abatement’, which 
maximizes social welfare but is not best outcome for the NGO. 
(iii) The choice of the firm yields the best outcome for the State and the NGO in all situations 
other than those indicated in (i) and (ii). 
Proof. The proofs can be derived easily. We detail it for the first statement of part (i) and 
other parts can be proved similarly. Note that if ( )1c Mγ= − , then M N M N cγ + = + − . 
On the other hand, if ( )1c Mγ< − , then M N M N cγ + < + − . Thereafter, the concerned 
statement follows directly from propositions 2, 3 and 4. Similar arguments lead to the proofs 
of the rest of the proposition.                                                                                
Proposition 4 reflects the divergence of interest between the firm, the NGO and the 
State. While it is impossible to have a coalition of interests whereby the firm’s choice is good 
for the NGO but not the State, other kinds of conflict of interests are possible. Why? When 
the firm innovates it cares only about its own profit π but not about the positive externality c 
it generates for the society through its innovation activity. The NGO on the other hand does 
not care about the firm’s profit, focussing only on consumers and the environment. But the 
State cares about all stakeholders and the environment. If π and c are both very low such that 
the innovation value (π + c) is also very low, the firm’s preference, the NGO’s preference and 
the society’s preference coincide in favour of ‘VA with abatement’ because the consequent 
fall in the innovation effort does not imply a lot of sacrifice for any stakeholder. But, for 
innovations with low c but higher π, the firm may prefer to abandon abatement completely as 
the opportunity cost from forgone innovation profit rises; but (π + c) may still be sufficiently 
low for the State to justify the lowering of innovation effort of the firm in order to preserve 
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the environment. Therefore, a conflict arises. But if π is very high such that (π + c) is also 
high, the State also supports ‘VA without abatement’: the abandoning of abatement effort or 
damage to the environment is compensated by a higher generation of market profit and 
consumer surplus. However, since the NGO does not care about the firm’s profit, here, a 
situation of conflict may arise between the preference of the NGO and the firm and even the 
State.  Similarly, if c is high and π is low, the firm may prefer to undertake abatement, but if 
the innovation value (π + c) is high enough, the State may not prefer the firm to continue with 
its abatement strategy as it reduces the expected gain from innovation. Furthermore, if c is 
very high and π is very low, the NGO may prefer the firm to practice ‘VA without abatement’ 
even if it is not in the best interest for both the firm and the society as a whole.  
These results are summarized in table 1. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
3.1 ON INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITIES AND CSR OUTCOMES 
Recall that the entire model has been developed supposing the absence of effective 
monitoring by a regulator in an economy and with a NGO substituting the regulator in 
monitoring and looking after consumers’ interest.  But this leads to another question: is 
having a NGO replace a regulator necessarily a good thing? The answer according to our 
model is given below.  
 
OBSERVATION 1: In economies with weak regulatory structure and NGO activism, the 
form of CSR that emerges through voluntary agreement between firms and NGOs may not be 
the preferred outcome from the perspective of either of the NGOs or society as a whole. 
There are even situations where the preferences of the NGOs may go against the interest of 
society as a whole. 
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Proof. The above observation follows directly from Proposition 4.                                                            
But the VA is enacted under the shadow of a legal system. How are the outcomes 
likely to change as γ which is the indicator of the credibility of the legal environment of a 
state rises? 
 
OBSERVATION 2: As the legal institutions become more effective, i.e. as γ rises,  
(i) the amount paid in CSR through VA in both the types of equilibriums  rises;  
(ii) the abatement effort supplied by the firm rises  
(iii) the likelihood that the firm chooses the ‘VA with abatement’ strategy increases;  
Proof.  It is to be noted that part 2(i) of the above observation can be easily derived from the 
expressions of *wz  and   as in equations (4) and (21) respectively.   
As to 2(ii), from equations (16) and (17) we obtain: 
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2 2
( ) ( , )( )a a aaj i ji
a j i ij
dD e g e ed p e
de de ee
β π
γ
⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ∂⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ∂⎢ ⎥∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦=∂ Δ ;     (27) 
where 
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
( ) ( , ) (.) (.) (.)( )
a a a
j i j a
j
i j j ij i j
d p e g e e g g gD e
e e e ede e e
π βγ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥Δ = − − + −⎜ ⎟ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
. 
From the second order condition of the solution to the firm’s profit maximization problem in 
the case of ‘VA with abatement’, we see that Δ > 0. Moreover, given the assumptions of the 
model, it follows that the numerator of the expression on the right hand side of equation (27) 
is positive. Therefore, 0
a
je
γ
∂ >∂ .   
Finally, observation 2(iii) issues from propositions 1 and 3.   
 
 
24 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Firms can demonstrate their social responsibility either by ‘doing more good’ or 
‘doing less bad’ or both. The economics literature has mainly examined these two paths as 
stand-alone options, with much more focus on the means to persuade the firm to do ‘less bad’ 
through appropriate regulatory instruments such as VA. Two other common features of the 
existing models are consideration of regions with efficient and capable regulators and firms 
in a post-innovation production phase, which can reduce environmental damage through 
investment in abatement. In contrast, in order to add more insight to the less studied contexts, 
the present paper has examined innovating firms which have to chalk out their abatement 
strategies before setting up the manufacturing units, via bargaining with an NGO, existing in 
lieu of a regulator.  
In the game developed, the first mover, the firm, chooses its innovation effort in 
tandem with one of two alternative modes of CSR. Under the ‘VA without abatement’, the 
firm does not spend any amount a priori in abatement and bargains with the NGO over the 
amount of a lump sum payment towards community development; while under the ‘VA with 
abatement’, the firm decides the abatement effort unilaterally and then initiates the bargaining 
process with the NGO. The choice of the firm between a ‘VA without abatement’ and a ‘VA 
with abatement’ identified as a function of the parametric configurations reveals the rationale 
of the firm CSR strategy and permits an evaluation of outcomes also from the point of view 
of the NGO and the State.  
Our model demonstrates that the choice of the firm about the type of VA hinges on 
the tradeoffs between appropriating the full innovation profit and paying a high lump sum 
towards community development or sacrificing some of the innovation profit by lowering 
innovation effort, but gaining in terms of paying a lesser amount towards community 
development. It indicates that if the innovation is radical with a high expected profit, the firm 
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is likely to offer a VA to spend on community development without investment in abatement. 
The NGO on the other hand evaluates outcomes according to the gains to consumers, while 
the State is concerned with maximization of social welfare. Through a series of propositions 
we showed that there are parameter configurations, where there is a similitude of interests, 
and others, where the interests of the stakeholders diverge. Thus, the model advocates a case 
by case consideration of CSR associated with contested innovations, without calling for 
general rules. 
 It has already been confirmed in the theoretical literature (see survey that Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2008) that requiring or even persuading firms to undertake abatement via VA may 
not always be in the interests of society. Our paper confirms this result in the context of 
innovation, where more than one kind of CSR option is possible. What is noteworthy is that 
even the preferences of NGO watch dogs may not be in the interests of society. This is 
particularly in the case of radical innovations which hold high profit potential for the firm but 
without commensurate surplus for the consumer. In this case, the State is willing to overlook 
the damage caused to the environment, and prefers to permit full innovation in return for 
lump sum compensation towards local community development. However, if the State (say of 
developing countries) invests in strengthening its regulatory capabilities, our paper indicates 
that not only will the probability of the firm opting for ‘VA with abatement’ increase, but the 
CSR investment towards community development will also increase under any kind of VA.  
             Finally, while the present paper has studied the interaction between a firm and an 
NGO via VA, the model developed can be extended to answer many important questions 
treated in the standard literature on VA interactions between firms and a regulator. For 
instance, we can probe deeper into what constitutes a better strategy for the regulator: is it 
negotiating over ‘abatement’ or ‘non-abatement’ CSR? What will be the firm’s preference 
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over these options? What will happen if both are negotiated at the same time? Indeed, the 
exploration of such issues can be considered as agenda for research in the future. 
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FIGURE 1. SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS IN THE ‘INNOVATION WITH CSR’ GAME 
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TABLE 1. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIRM’S INNOVATION CUM CSR STRATEGY 
FOR THE STATE AND THE NGO 
 π low π medium π high 
c low The firm’s choice of 
‘VA with abatement’ 
yields the best 
outcome for both the 
NGO and the State. 
Firm chooses ‘VA 
without abatement’. 
But this is not the best 
outcome for NGO and 
society.  
Firm chooses ‘VA 
without abatement’. 
This is the best 
outcome for society but 
not NGO. 
 
c high Firm chooses ‘VA 
with abatement’. This 
is the best outcome for 
society but not NGO. 
 
 
Firm chooses ‘VA with 
abatement’. 
But this is not the best 
outcome for NGO and 
society. 
The firm’s choice of 
‘VA without 
abatement’ yields the 
best outcome for both 
the NGO and the State. 
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